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COMMENTARY
THE CONSTITUTION GOES TO HARVARD
Henry Paul Monaghan*
I
Doctrinal disorder haunts a generation of Supreme Court decisions
construing and applying the strands of the fourteenth amendment.1 But in
a confusion contest between the Court and academic writers on constitu-
tional law, picking a winner would be no simple task. Those of us in the
academy, despite our comparatively ample time for reflection, have long
resisted discussion of fundamental issues.
Professors Tribe and Michelman, two of our ablest writers, illustrate
my point in their provocative recent essays on National League of Cities
v. Usery.2 Neither purports to erect more adequate scaffolding for the
decision's federalism foundation. 3 Rather, each attempts to transform the
* Professor of Law, Boston University.
"Except in the area of law in which the Framers obviously meant [the equal protec-
tion clause] to apply - classifications based on race or on national origin, the first cousin of
race - the Court's decisions can fairly be described as an endless tinkering with legislative
judgments, a series of conclusions unsupported by any central guiding principle." Trimble
v. Gordon 430 U.S. 762, 777 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). There is, for this purpose,
no material difference between equal protection and due process. See generally Monaghan,
Of "'Liberty" and "Property," 62 CORNELL L.J. 405 (1977). Accordingly, I will use the
fourteenth amendment as a generic term to include the substantive component of the due
process clause of the fifth amendment.
2 426 U.S. 833 (1976). Tribe, Unravelling National League of Cities: The New
Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential Government Services, 90 -ARV. L. REv.
1065 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Tribe, Neiv Federalism]. Michelman, States' Rights and
States' Roles: Permutations of "Sovereignty" in National League of Cities v. Usery, 86
YALE L.J. 1165 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Michelman, States' Rights]. See also L.
T BE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, § 5-22 (1978) [hereinafter cited as L. TRIBE,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw].
3 Indeed, viewed against the backdrop of "normal" (state autonomy) federalism
theory, Professor Michelman provides a particularly powerful criticism of National League
of Cities. For both Tribe and Michelman National League of Cities' "federalism" aspect is
not the protection of the states qua states against national authority. It is, rather, derivative:
Congress cannot interfere with the states in the discharge of the independent social service
functions which under the fourteenth amendment they "owe" to their citizens.
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decision into one which, in Professor Tribe's words, will contribute to a
"just constitutional order." ' 4 That order, in turn, has a centerpiece, a
theory of "affi'mative" constitutional claims against the government. I
doubt that the persuasiveness of such a theory is enhanced by this rework-
ing of National League of Cities. My interest, however, is in the underly-
ing theory, for which National League of Cities ostensibly becomes both
"surprising" 5 supporting evidence and an attractive, though subtle,
showcase.
The affirmative claims thesis has roots in an earlier, widely noticed
essay by Professor Michelman arguing that the fourteenth amendment
should be read as requiring the government to satisfy the "minimum just
wants" of its citizens.' This conception radically transcends the tradi-
tional orthodoxy that the amendment's guarantees are essentially negative
- rights to be free from certain governmentally imposed burdens, dis-
abilities and discriminations - rather than a source of positive claims to
public funds, employment or property. 7 At first blush one is tempted to
say that, if taken seriously, affirmative claims doctrine would place the
entire governmental structure in a gigantic federal judicial receivership.
8
But given the present level of governmental intervention in health, educa-
tion, and housing, this objection may not be very formidable. If four-
teenth amendment "duties," as posited by affirmative claims theory, are
activated in part by legislative recognition of "just wants," judicial de-
crees would frequently be directives to reshape existing programs rather
than to create novel ones. 9 In any event, both Professors Michelman and
Tribe, in apparent recognition of the tension between their view and the
central constitutional axiom that, in our representative democracy,
policymaking is assigned to the elected branches of the government,
Tribe, New Federalism, supra note 2, at 1066.
Sid,
Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term - Foreword: On Protecting the Poor
Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REv. 7 (1969). See also Karst, The
Supreme Court, 1976 Term - Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 59-64 (1977).
7 See Monaghan, supra note 1, at 413-14. In certain limited areas, such as the crimi-
nal process, it is at least arguable that "affirmative" rights are being judicially enforced.
See, e.g., Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977) (constitutional right of access to the
courts requires prison authorities to provide prisoners with adequate law libraries and legal
assistance).
1 This would not be true of a regime based on Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905), which could be enforced by negative decrees.
0 See Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights: One View of Rawls'
Theory of Justice, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 962, 1013-15 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Michel-
man, Welfare Rights].
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willingly posit that many affirmative claims would not be judicially en-
forceable.10 Mr. Justice Holmes' earthy positivism notwithstanding, 1
there is no logical difficulty with this position. Nonetheless, such a limi-
tation is at least suggestive that the affirmative claims theorists apprehend
the unpalatability of their view. 12
My major difficulty is elsewhere. What are the essential premises
relating a theory of affirmative claims to the fourteenth amendment? On
the surface at least Professors Michelman and Tribe are open to an in-
terpretation that, at bottom, the fourteenth amendment magnetically at-
tracts any theory - whether it be that of Herbert Spencer or John Rawls
- which its holder asserts will promote a "just constitutional order."
Arguments about the fourteenth amendment are thus transformed into ar-
guments about the nature of distributive justice.13 On such a view, as one
of my former students contends, the entire history of "Western Democ-
racy,"' 14 let alone Justice Frankfurter's traditions of "English-speaking
peoples,""'i becomes a vast reservoir of potential constitutional princi-
ples. Assumptions of this, or slightly narrower, dimensions are implicit
(they are seldom explicit) in virtually every piece written on the four-
teenth amendment, all on the assumed premise that the amendment's lan-
guage is "open textured" or "spacious."' 6 But is all this correct? Or
does the constitution itself, fairly read in light of its "origin and the line
10 Michelman, States' Rights, supra note 2, at 1191 n.86; Tribe, New Federalism,
supra note 2, at 1088-90.
11 "Legal obligations that exist but cannot be enforced are ghosts that are seen in the
law but that are elusive to the grasp." The Western Maid, 257 U.S. 419, 433 (1922)
(Holmes, J.). But see Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 487-88 (1903) (Holmes, J.).
12 While Professor Tribe refers to these affirmative claims as "rights," Tribe, Nell,
Federalism, supra note 2, at 1076, and Professor Michelman calls them "inchoate rights,"
Michelman, States' Rights, supra note 2, at 1191, I have described their theory in terms of
"claims." While this is a matter of form, I do so because traditionally the term right has an
"adjudicatory" character. Moreover, I do not believe that the components of the authors'
"affirmative claims" can be formulated with enough clarity and specificity to fit within our
general conception of what constitutes a "right." But see Michelman, State's Rights,
supra note 2, at 1190 n.84. See also Karst, supra note 6, at 59-64.
11 Of course, the theory must be "principled." In large measure that requirement
means only that the resulting doctrine be logically coherent, a condition applicable to all
rational discourse. In addition, I suppose that the requirement of principle would in the
specific context of constitutional law require that the doctrine not "obviously" contradict
the constitutional text or structure.
14 Note, Of Interests Fundamental and- Compelling: The Emerging Con.stitutional
Balance, 57 B.U.L. REv. 462, 476 (1977).
15 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 67 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
16 On the assertedly open-ended nature of the due process clause as a matter of original
understanding, see Monaghan, supra note 1, at 414-16. Compare Munzer & Nickel, Doe.%
The Constitution Mean What It Alvays Meant?, 77 COLUM. L. Rv. 1029 (1977).
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of [its] growth," 17 fix relatively circumscribed limits on the sources
which one may properly invoke for the development of substantive con-
stitutional principle?
18
We are not in need of inventive articles on whether fornication
among consenting adults is constitutionally protected activity. 19 We have
for a long time been in desperate need of focused and sustained scholarly
attention directed to the question of the appropriate sources of doctrine for
the fourteenth amendment. 20 Happily, I see increasing evidence that
academic energy is now being devoted to first principles. Professor Brest
has published his pathbreaking casebook, Processes of Constitutional
Decisionmaking.2 1 Professor Tribe has just published an admirable and
stimulating treatise which, inter alia, contains a comprehensive model for
an "activist," "open-ended" view of the constitution generally and of
the fourteenth amendment specifically. 22 It will take time to digest this
important work, but quite obviously the persuasiveness of his justifica-
tions warrants careful attention.
17 Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 610 (1914) (Holmes, J.).
" The problem is not limited to the due process and equal protection clauses. Profes-
sor Ackerman has recently published a book on the taking clause. B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE
PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION (1977). He quickly, and apparently happily, comes to
the conclusion that nothing in the text or the intent of the clause is helpful as to its content.
And this conclusion frees him for a lengthy analysis of the clause, in which he compares
two different philosophical world views (Utilitarianism and Kantianism) with that of "Or-
dinary Layman." So far as I can see, Professor Ackerman's conceptual apparatus is readily
transplanted to many constitutional provisions, particularly due process and equal protec-
tion, I fully recognize that philosophy is now very "in" among academic lawyers. It is,
after all, no surprise that its normative, integrative approach would push economically
oriented law thinking and research off center stage. One must, therefore, now have, or at
least be prepared to deal with, "world views." But, even so, what has all this to do with
constitutional law? For me this is a bothersome problem which runs through all of the juris-
prudentially oriented writings of Professor Dworkin on the subject of constitutional law.
For him, the fourteenth amendment seems only a platform for the expression of philosophi-
cal ideas.
" The inevitable has occurred. Despite Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F.
Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), affd men., 425 U.S. 901 (1976), a state court has sustained
such a claim. See State v. Saunders, 46 U.S.L.W. 2344 (Gen. N.J. Dec. 13, 1977), a
decision by a court which has long been a "leader" in constitutional invention-innovation
(pick one). Professor Tribe would apparently agree with this decision. See L. TRIBE, CON-
STITUTIONAL LAw, supra note 2, § 15-3.
20 This is true even if we rigorously separate the question of what the constitution
means from the nature and scope of its judicial construction. L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW, supra note 2, § 3-4.
" P. BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND MATE-
RIALS (1975), reviewed in Monaghan, Book Review, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1977).
22 L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, supra note 2, § 3-4.
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II
In Government by Judiciary23 Raoul Berger, too, pursues fundamen-
tals. But he reaches conclusions far different from those of Professor
Tribe. Indeed, his conclusions represent a sharp challenge to virtually
every current conception of the fourteenth amendment. Berger advances
two central points. First, the intention of the framers of §1 of the four-
teenth amendment fixes its meaning. Second, that intention is both clear
and specific: the framers designed § 1 to implant the rights guaranteed by § I
of the 1866 Civil Rights Act into the constitutional text. The Act provided:
That all persons born in the United States and not subject to any
foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby de-
clared to be citizens of the United States; and such citizens, of
every race and color, without regard to any previous condition
of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall
have the same right, in every State and Territory in the United
States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and
give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and con-
vey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of
all laws and proceedings for the security of person and prop-
erty, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like
punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law,
statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary not-
withstanding.2 4
Berger summarizes his view of the fourteenth amendment as fol-
lows:
The three clauses of § I were three facets of one and the same
concern: to insure that there would be no discrimination against
the freedmen in respect of "fundamental rights," which [be-
cause of the 1866 Act] had clearly understood and narrow com-
pass. Roughly speaking, the substantive rights were identified
by the privileges or immunities clause; the equal protection
clause was to bar legislative discrimination with respect to
23 R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOUR-
TEENTH AMENDMENT (1977).
24 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982 (1970)).
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those rights; and the judicial machinery to secure them was to
be supplied by nondiscriminatory due process of the several
States ... The framers, it needs to be said at once, had no
thought of creating unfamiliar rights of unknown, far-reaching
extent by use of the words "equal protection" and "due pro-
cess." Instead, they meant to secure familiar, "fundamental
rights," and only those, and to guard them as of yore against
deprivation except by (1) a nondiscriminatory law, and (2) the
established judicial procedure of the State.
2 5
In Berger's view, therefore, § 1 of the fourteenth amendment was a
conservative, restrained measure: its premise was that slavery is not in
fact or law abolished unless the freed man has certain civil rights: rights to
personal security, to contract, to hold property, etc. 26 But the amend-
ment's framers intentionally left untouched racial discrimination in politi-
cal and social matters. This latter fact, Berger contends, is unremarkable,
given the pervasive Negrophobia of the day, one shared in varying de-
grees by the radicals themselves.
2 7
This leads Mr. Berger to two specific conclusions - that the fram-
ers intended neither school segregation nor voting in state elections to be
within the ambit of § 1. More generally, of course, Berger concludes that
the Supreme Court decisions imposing nontextually specified values, for
example, of the procreative choice variety, unquestionably go far beyond
the framer's intention. Their intention was to protect a specific, closed
category of interests, not to create an open-ended license to the national
government, particularly its judges, to demand from the states whatever
might momentarily seem essential to current conceptions of "ordered lib-
erty" or a "just constitutional order."
There are, I recognize, lawyers and scholars whose constitutional
philosophy is organized around a belief in a "living constitution." As the
metaphor expands the Supreme Court plays the role of an on-duty physi-
cian charged with keeping the Constitution ever young and healthy. Not
surprisingly, proponents of that view express indifference, even scorn,
2 8
2 R. BERGER, supra note 23, at 18-19.
16 Id. at 22-29.
27 Id. at 10 ("The key to an understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment is that the
North was shot through with Negrophobia, that the Republicans, except for a minority of
extremists, were swayed by racism that gripped their constitutents rather than by abolitionist
ideology.").
28 See L. LEVY, JUDGMENTS: ESSAYS IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 17
(1972). See Monaghan, supra note 1, at 414-15. Professor Cover apparently subscribes to
this view. While reviewing Berger's book, he writes,
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for any real concern with the intent of those initially responsible for a
constitutional provision. But the standing tradition is, at least formally, to
the contrary. Thus, in his important article on the segregation cases Pro-
fessor Bickel began by emphasizing the relevance of an inquiry into orig-
inal intent.2 9 He rightly cautioned, however, that such an inquiry be un-
dertaken not in "mechanical" fashion, but rather as" 'a function of state
craft' and of historical insight." 30 So approached, there is an inevitable
and ever increasing tendency heavily to discount original intent in certain
areas, particularly with respect to the 1789 and 1791 "constitutions," at
least if intent is viewed in relatively narrow, specific terms. With respect
to general questions of separation of powers31 and perhaps of federal-
ism 32 the underlying mode of judicial analysis is that of reasoning and
drawing inferences from the structure and relationships created by the
1789 document.33 As to the bill of rights, judges and scholars have
downplayed a narrow conception of original intent through a two-stage
process. First, the relevance of the concrete historical experience is
minimized. For example, they deny that the religion clauses can be said
If the Supreme Court ought to labor under the constraint of the framers' specific
intentions it is because we and our progeny will find it useful that the justices be
constrained in that way. In other words this reading of the Constitution must stand
or fall not upon the Constitution's self-evident meaning, nor upon the intentions
of 1787 or 1866 framers. It constitutes ajudgment about our own political present
and future and about alternative theories of judicial activity which will best serve
it. The ultimate and only justification for the constitutional government we have is
that it will secure to us and our posterity the blessings of liberty - not that it was
intended by the framers to bind us.
Cover, Book Review, ThE NEw REPUBLIC, Jan. 14, 1978, at 26-27. One wonders whether
Professor Cover would feel the same way about a constitutional amendment passed ten
years ago.
29 Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L.
REv. 1, 2-6 (1955).
30 Id. at 5 (quoting F. FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND THE SUPREME
COURT 76 (1938)).
31 E.g., Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
32 For a dramatic recent illustration, see United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax
Comm'n, 98 S. Ct. 799, 807-08 (1978): "This suggests that the Framers used the words
'treaty', 'compact', and 'agreement' as terms of art, for which no explanation was required
and with which we are unfamiliar .... Whatever distinct meanings the Framers attributed
to the terms in Art. 1, §10, those meanings were soon lost."
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), correctly asked (but in my
opinion incorrectly answered) the question whether the position of the states in the federal
union implied some limitation of the otherwise sweeping federal commerce power.
11 See generally C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw (1969).
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simply to embody the antecedent Virginia practice,3 4 or the confrontation
clause the common law rules of evidence. 35 The intent problem is then
refocused: original intent is conceptualized at a sufficiently general level
to permit dealing with the matters at hand,3 6 sometimes with considera-
ble strain on the amendment's concrete historical background3 7 and in-
deed its language. 3 8 This process has, in part, been reinforced by at-
tempts to distinguish between the "meaning" of the provision, and its
"application.'"39
Set against this background, Berger's uncomfortable and unfashion-
able analysis is an important one. It will not do, as some have already
done, to brush it aside in a peremptory manner. For I would insist that
any theory of constitutional interpretation which renders unimportant or
irrelevant questions as to original intent, so far as that intent can be fairly
discerned, is not, given our traditions, politically or intellectually defen-
sible. 40 And Berger argues that, whatever may be said of the eighteenth
century document, the intent of the framers of the fourteenth amendment
is clearly discernible. 4 1 All students of constitutional history agree that a
major concern of § I was to place the 1866 act on an incontrovertible con-
34 See, e.g., L. TInE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 2, § 14-3.
35 See, e.g., Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory of
Evidence for Criminal Cases, 91 HARV. L. REv. 567, 568-69 (1978).
36 "Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes. There-
fore a principle to be vital must be capable of wider application than the mischief which
gave it birth." Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910). Professor Ely follows
that tradition in writing that constitutional provisions should be applied to new situations
involving, "the sorts of evils the framers meant to combat and ... their twentieth century
counterparts." Ely, The Wages of Crying Wotf" A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE
L.J. 920, 929 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf].
37 Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 86-103 (1970) (despite the fourteenth century
origins of the twelve-person jury, the sixth and fourteenth amendment jury trial guarantee is
satisfied by a six-person body). For further developments, see Ballew v. Georgia, 46
U.S.L.W. 4217 (U.S. 1978) (five-person jury held unconstitutional).
31 See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 472-75 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
39 See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926); Gaffney,
History and Legal Interpretation: Tile Early Distortion of the Fourteenth Amendment by
the GildedAge Court, 25 CATH. U.L. REv. 207, 215-16 (1976); cf. Wofford, Tile Blind-
lng Light: The Uses of History in Constitutional Interpretation, 31 U. CHI. L. REv. 502,
521 (1964) ("[mleaning is application"). The distinction between changes in meaning and
application has been applied in the federalism area. See Pensacola Tel. Co. v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 96 U.S. 1 (1877).
40 Bickel, supra note 29, at 3-4.
41 It needs to be emphasized that the records of the 39th Congress are free from
the reproach often leveled at legislative history - that it is 'enigmatic'. A state-
Constitution at Harvard
stitutional foundation.4" Berger's critical conclusion is that this
exhausted their intention. Given the importance of this contention, we
shall undoubtedly see, and can no doubt profit from, another round of
discussion on that matter. Indeed, Berger's colleague, John Ely, as yet 4
3
no advocate of the position that there is a limitless source of principles for
giving content to the fourteenth amendment, has recently prepared an im-
portant analysis arguing, inter alia, that Berger's description of the evi-
dence of framers' intention is excessively restrictive.
4 4
I cannot in this brief comment defoliate that thicket, even if were I to
possess far better scholarly qualifications for such a task than I in fact do.
My own examination of the historical materials and of the numerous
commentaries thereon has left me impressed with the considerable
strength of Mr. Berger's case, particularly his conclusion that voting in
state elections was not an interest embraced within §1 of the amend-
ment.45 But despite the stimulation of his book, I have become increas-
ingly doubtful that any conclusive case can be made one way or the other.
It is an understatement to say that the framers lacked clarity in their think-
ing, and Berger certainly shows that many apparently thought that §1 of
the fourteenth amendment and § 1 of the 1866 act were equivalents. But
the hard fact remains that the amendment's language is eye-catchingly
different from and far more inclusive than that of the 1866 act. And, as
Professor Ely emphasizes, 46 that language is entitled to be treated as the
strongest and best evidence of the overall intention of the framers, whose
ment such as that of Charles P. Curtis, "It is a [sic] hallucination: this search for
intent. The room is always dark" simply cannot stand up against these records.
R. BEROER, supra note 23, at 6.
42 It turns out that the fourteenth amendment was unnecessary for this purpose. The
1866 act could rest upon § 2 of the thirteenth amendment. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,
392 U.S. 409 (1968); L. TIaBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 2, § 5-13.
41 Compare Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf, supra note 36, with Ely, Constitutional
Interpretivism: Its Allure and Impossibility, forthcoming in 53 IND. L.J. (1978) (lecture
delivered on Feb. 7, 1978, at the Indiana Law School) [hereinafter cited as Ely, Constiut-
tional Interpretivisml.
- 44 Ely, Constitutional Interpretivism, supra note 43. Like Berger, Ely would em-
phasize the privileges and immunities clause, rather than the due process clause, as the tex-
tual "home" for whatever substantive rights exist. This leads to the question whether that
clause is limited to natural persons. C. FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, 1864-
88: PART ONE 1387-88 (6 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (P.
Freund ed. 1971)).
45 I recognize that textually one could argue that this is so because § 2 of the amend-
ment deals with the subject, see Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54-55 (1974), and
accordingly, only voting in state elections is exempted from the general reach of § 1.
46 Ely, Constitutional Interpretivism, supra note 43.
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"specific" intention in the turbulent thirty-ninth Congress hardly ap-
proached unanimity. Moreover, unlike the 1866 act, the congressionally
fashioned fourteenth amendment was not a completed legal act: it re-
quired ratification in the several states before becoming effective. It is
surely plausible, given the general character of §1's phrasing, that the
ratifiers - those who gave the amendment legal life - perceived that
they had approved a constitutional change more sweeping than a simple
codification of the 1866 act.
Plausible, yes - but a wholly satisfying rebuttal to Berger, no. For I
think the framers mirrored the views of the country. We forget that many
mid-nineteenth century Americans, perhaps a clear majority, opposed
slavery and racial equality with equal intensity. They could logically be-
lieve that emancipation required that the freed man possess certain rights
to personal security and property. Simultaneously, they could favor rank
discrimination against blacks in political and social matters. 47 Setting the
language of the fourteenth amendment against these complexities only
deepens the mystery for me. Mindful of Hume's admonition that "a wise
man . ., proportions his belief to the evidence," 4 8 I conclude that what
the framers thought §1 embodied cannot be determined with certainty.
Nonetheless, the general language of §1, coupled with some supportive
legislative history, seems to me to allow the judgment that §1 goes
beyond the 1866 act.
Even if its architects intended § I to transcend the 1866 act, the ques-
tion persists of how sweeping a change in the governmental structure §1
authorized. Those who attack Mr. Berger frequently slip in a comfortable
non sequitur at this point: they assume that if Berger is in error, § 1 per-
force has a dynamic content. Logically, however, their demonstration
that Berger's list of § I rights is too narrow is not proof that it is proper to
measure the content of the fourteenth amendment by other than some
closed set of rights as they were understood in 1868. In other words, their
attack does not dispose of a limited conception of the fourteenth amend-
ment, with the judge's function being essentially historical49 - to enter a
time machine, return to the year 1868, and scrutinize "contemporary"
sources to determine the extent to which the assertedly expansive lan-
guage of § 1 is qualified and limited by some narrow set of controlling
47 This theme runs through D. POTTER, THE IMPENDING CIuSIS 1848-1861 (1977).
48 D. HUME, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 120 (Gateway
ed. 1956).
40 Mr. Justice Gray once insisted that "all questions of constitutional construction"
are, at bottom, "largely a historical question." Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 169
(1895) (Gray, J., dissenting).
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objectives. Thus § 1 would prohibit only what fell within those objectives,
however conceptualized, and "their twentieth century conterparts." My
own problems become acute here, because I doubt the viability of any
such inquiry. But it seems to me that my worries should be shared by the
"dynamists" as well. Does the language of §1 yield a "dynamic" con-
tent merely because it is capable of supporting such a result?50 Or is it
necessary to go further and establish, a hard task given Berger's contrary
showing, 5' that either the framers or the ratifiers intended a dynamic,
"open texture" to §1?52 Whatever justifications "dynamists" may
mount on behalf of their results, the challenges of Government by
Judiciary cannot honestly be ignored.
53
I recognize that one can conceptualize the original intent of the
framers and ratifiers at a sufficiently generalized level so that one can re-
sort to the ancient "distinction" between meaning and application. Thus
Roe v. Wade might be viewed as simply giving new application to the
"original" meaning of the due process (or privileges and immunities)
clause. But I have considerable difficulty with any such approach to con-
stitutional provisions. Excessive generalization as to "intent" seems at
war with any belief that a constitutional amendment is a conscious altera-
tion of the frame of government whose major import should be reasona-
bly apparent to those who gave it life. The framers and ratifiers could
have enacted an amendment which imposed the dictates of "ordered lib-
erty," static or evolving, on the states. I find too little in the relevant
source material, including the constitutional text, to think it more proba-
ble than not that any such sweeping change in the governmental structure
was intended. Moreover, and more importantly, I am unable to believe
'0 Many efforts at describing the framers intention in "dynamic" terms are simply
conclusionary, resting upon the "general" language of § 1. See, e.g., Karst, supra note 6,
at 17. Notice that Professor Bickel, supra note 29, apparently believed that the fact that the
amendment's language was capable of a dynamic content did not obviate the need for a
sustained focus on the legislative history.
51 It is almost amusing to see advocates of a dynamic content quoting the few favorable
snippets and fragments from the legislative history.
52 Professor Bickel's well-known argument that the fourteenth amendment has a gen-
eral expanding content which was the intended result of a deliberate "compromise" be-
tween radicals and moderates, Bickel, supra note 29, at 61-63, strikes me as resting on a
very dubious historical foundation. See R. BERGER, supra note 23, at 104-05.
51 There is an additional problem. I have seridus doubts about whether "open textured
provisions" can be enforced by courts. These provisions seem to me too indeterminate in
content to serve as predicates for judicial action. Professor Fairman states that Senator Re-
veredy Johnson's position implied that the privilege and immunities clause "for purposes of
litigation ... did not have a definite meaning." C. FAIRMAN, supra note 44, at 1297.
By contrast, I am not convinced by Berger's view that congressional power under § 5 is
limited by the content of the 1866 act.
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that in light of the then prevailing concepts of representative democracy,
the framers or ratifiers of § 1 intended the courts (rather than the national
legislature pursuant to §5) to weave the tapestry of federally protected
rights against state government.
Finally, I return to where I began. I cannot free myself from some
concern for the original intent of those responsible for § 1. Thus unliber-
ated and on the basis of the available evidence, I find it impossible to
accept a contention that § I was to encompass claims of affirmative gov-
ernmental duty. For me the arguments of Professors Tribe and Michel-
man are incomplete. Professor Tribe focuses upon Supreme Court deci-
sions in support of affirmative claims theory. He is surely right in
stressing how frequently they in fact reflect a perception about the impor-
tance of certain "just wants." '5 4 But I think it fair to say that his analysis
feeds heavily upon the existing doctrinal disorder and that the core of re-
cent judicial decisions is hard against him. Professor Michelman ad-
vances a different, theoretically oriented approach.5 5 To my eye, its cru-
cial point resides in the assertion that the merits of affirmative claims
theory "cannot be conclusively resolved by historical research into what
the framers had in mind" and in a supporting footnote endorsing the view
that as "a matter of actual history" we have a 'natural-law Constitu-
tion'." 5 6 Perhaps he is right in his conclusions about our "actual his-
tory." But viewed in terms of "historical research," I am not persuaded.
The relevant history simply cannot be read to support a claim that the
fourteenth amendment was designed to require affirmative state responses
to private claims to governmental services. The political thinking of the
amendment's day could neither absorb nor comprehend a conception of
modem, "activist" government. The framers and ratifiers of the four-
teenth amendment acted against a widely shared intellectual background,
that of a negative, limited, passive, laissez-faire government. Thug, I can
understand a view of the amendment which goes beyond the 1866 act in an
effort to enlarge personal autonomy by positing fundamental rights and a
freedom from unreasonable discriminations. 57 I cannot, however, bridge
the gap from the fourteenth amendment to affirmative claims theory,
however moving as a matter of political and social justice the latter may
be. 58 Perhaps the intent of the framers can be conceptualized to support
54 Tribe, New Federalism, supra note 2, at 1078-90.
11 Michelman, Welfare Rights, supra note 9, at 1003-19.
56 Id. at 1005.
57 L. TRLIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, supra note 2, at §§ 15-1 to -21 (1978).
51 Of course, sympathy with the affirmative claims theory view has consequences at
the judicial level, affecting as it does questions of statutory construction. Michelman, Wel-
/'are Rights, supra note 9, at 1013-14.
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affirmative claims theory in the context of an "activist" state, but the
task remains unaccomplished. 59 If it cannot be done, the theory can en-
dure only upon an argument - not palatable to me - that the question of
original intent is irrelevant. If so, when did it become irrelevant? Why?
Absent a satisfactory account of original intent by affirmative right
theorists, I shall persist in the belief that the good citizens of Utah may
organize their polity around "right wing" economic and social theory.
The fourteenth amendment should not be interpreted in either the
Supreme Court or the Harvard Law School to forbid such a result. The
fourteenth amendment does not require anti-Lochner.
60
III
If affirmative claims theory cannot be reconciled with any accepta-
ble conception of original intent, Berger's view, whatever its intrinsic
merit as an historical inquiry, presents me with an equally unacceptable
interpretation of the fourteenth amendment. This is not because I am (as
yet) sympathetic to the expansive, open-ended views on the meaning of
the constitutional text. Far from it. I prefer to leave the present free to
govern itself though the ordinaty political processes sanctioned by the
constitution. My reason is unabashedly conservative: nearly a century of
constitutional interpretation contrary to Berger's premises has created and
crystallized important expectations far too ingrained in our political-
constitutional order to be uprooted. Accordingly, whatever the framers
thought about the applicability of the bill of rights to the states, for exam-
ple, no justice could adequately and responsibly defend today the position
that the first amendment restricts only the central government. 61 Of
59 One could argue that the now apparent vagueness of § I's language supports a view
that the framers intended to enact only general principles, whose meaning might so far
evolve as to forbid practices which the framers at that time had no thought of abrogating.
See Bickel, supra note 29, at 63-64.
6o But see Tribe, New Federalism, supra note 2, at 1087-90.
61 For this reason, Justice Harlan's opinion in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 152
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) has always struck me as among
the most interesting in constitutional law. There Justice Harlan cast a fifth vote against a
congressional act lowering the voting age in state elections to 18. Most of his elaborate
opinion was designed to show that the voting was not an interest protected by § 1 of the
fourteenth amendment, a position which I think is historically correct but which seemed
foreclosed by a long and unbroken line of Supreme Court authority. Justice Harlan admitted
this and that if he followed authority he would have felt constrained to uphold that act. 400
U.S. at 152. Nonetheless, he devoted but a few paragraphs to the claims of stare decisis,
ultimately rejecting it on this "fundamental" matter. Id. at 218-19. 1 think he was mistaken
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course, it could be argued that the court as a whole, and not an individual
justice, should reconsider that position. 62 But my own sense is that it is
far too late for views which, in the name of original truth, would re-
volutionize the existing constitutional order.63 Indeed, while current
members of the court act - although they do not write - on the view
that stare decisis is inapplicable to any issue on which they can muster a
majority, the corresponding sense of impermanence in constitutional law
is misleading. Paul Freund long ago correctly noted that beneath the
widely advertised "discord" there is a large measure of "concord" on
important issues. 64 One such area is the applicability of the bill of rights
to the states; another is that § I imposes some restraints beyond those of
amendments 1-8. In short, my view is that "old" constitutional revolu-
tions, if that is what they are, are to be protected; new ones quaranteened
so far as possible. 65 This is not purely (although it is, no doubt, in part) a
psychological mind set resistant to change, one comfortable with the past,
"any" past, but fearful of the future. It is, I think, because I really do not
believe that "constitutionalizing" a subject - withdrawing it from the
reach of the ordinary political process - is readily consistent with the
fundamental axiom of our constitutional order, namely, representative
democracy. 66 The "critical" fact, Professor Ely rightly observes, is that
at this point. I have grave doubts that a judge should cast a deciding vote on the basis of a
theory, however historically correct, that is unacceptable not only to his own colleagues but
which is unlikely to be acceptable to any future justice.
62 Berger's central theses are not dependent on how one resolves this separate issue
which is one of substantial concern for him. R. BERGER, supra note 23, at 412-14.
03 See Monaghan, supra note 1, at 409-10 (1977) (criticizing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S.
693 (1976), for its departure from judicial precedent, even though the decision was probably
reflective of original intent).
01 P. FREUND, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS BUSINESS, PUR-
POSES, AND PERFORMANCE 28-56 (1961). I recognize that this "concord" is not necessarily
because of a respect for stare decisis; it may simply reflect agreement with the substantive
holdings. On the general uses of stare decisis in tight spots, see Wolman v. Walter, 433
U.S. 229, 251 n.18 (1977).
65 I recognize that my view of stare decisis may be of more interest to psychoanalysts
than to lawyers. Indeed, lawyers might be unkind enough to object to the fuzziness of the
formulation in the text. It conceals several discrete problems. Should judges adhere to
specific doctrines, e.g., overbreadth; specific theories? Do they have the power to modify
theories? The power to add new theories?
Moreover, I recognize that rigid insistence upon stare decisis is at variance with power-
ful intellectual currents, dominant in this century, rejecting any essentially static conception
of reality, physical, psychological, historical or otherwise. See F. BAUMAN, MODERN
EUROPEAN THOUGHT (1977).
66 This is a criticism not dependent on which organ "interprets" the constitution. For
the document itself is counter majoritarian where it withdraws any question from the ordi-
nary political process. And this is particularly bothersome where indeterminate clauses like
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"America has defined and designed its governmental system around the
core concept of representative democracy," and this fact "not only de-
scribes the initial [constitutional] document but its history." Indeed,
"excluding the Eighteenth and Twenty-First Amendments (the latter re-
pealed the former), six of our last ten constitutional amendments have
been concerned precisely with increasing popular control of our govern-
ment, and five of those six . . . extended the franchise to persons who
had previously been denied it.
6 7
This deep constitutional commitment to representative democracy
seems to me to have important consequences for constitutional interpreta-
tion. Most importantly for instant purposes, it counsels against the use of
constitutional amendments to invalidate the outcome produced by politi-
cal processes unless the language of the amendment, taken in its historical
setting, indicates some genuine concern with the kinds of problems at is-
sue. I recognize, of course, that legislation enacted by the normal
"democratic," political process - or, to put it more accurately, legisla-
tion enacted following some accommodation among competing interest
groups - often comes down particularly hard on certain minorities and
unorganized groups. How that fact is to be taken into account in a satis-
factory theory of constitutional adjudication remains to be worked out.
But it is surely a long way from that insight to a conclusion that the four-
teenth amendment guarantees an extensive range of fundamental rights,
to say nothing of affirmative claims, against the government. The "gov-
ernment" in this latter sense is, after all, simply a political process which,
perhaps from insensitivity, ranks its priorities differently from those who
have a particular view of a "just" social order.
due process are said to dictate such a result. I would add that the counter majoritarian diffi-
culty is magnified where the "interpreter" is a politically insulated body whose delibera-
tions occur in secret. But see L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 1-7, 1-8, 3-6. In this
regard I would add that, with deference to those who disagree, see Cover, supra note 28, I
do not see how the less than perfectly democratic character of the political branches en-
hances the democratic character of the court.
"I Ely, Constitutional Interpretivism, supra note 43. Compare Wolin, The State of
the Union, NEw YORK REVIEW oF BooKs, May 18, 1978, at 28.
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